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THE EFFECT OF CONTROL SOURCE  
AND CONTROL FRAMING ON EMPLOYEE EFFORT 
 
Prior research suggests that controls can negatively impact the motivation of employees 
to exert effort and that the detrimental effects of controls depend on control source. That 
is, controls cause more adverse behavior when employees attribute the source of control 
implementation to their manager’s decision than when the source of control 
implementation is beyond their manager’s authority. This study uses experiments to 
investigate whether the behavioral effects of controls depend not only on control source, 
but also on control framing, by which managers can frame the control implementation 
either for monitoring or coordinating purposes. The study also suggests that the 
interaction of control source and control framing impacts the strength of vertical 
collective identity, i.e. the shared identity between managers and employees, which in 
turn explains the differences in employee effort. While this study documents that the 
interaction of control source and control framing has no effect on vertical collective 
identity or employee effort, it finds a surprising result: employees respond more 
positively to the monitoring-framed controls than to the coordinating-framed controls, 
particularly when the controls are imposed by the manager. This finding suggests that 
persuasive messages can backfire if the employees are aware of the manager’s potentially 
self-serving motives behind the control implementation. 
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 Formal control systems are crucial to an organization’s success as controls serve a 
vital role in both directing employees’ effort to achieve organizational goals (Bowles & 
Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Christ, Emett, Summers, & Wood, 2012; Coletti, Sedatole, & 
Towry, 2005) and safeguarding organizational resources (Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2007). When implementing formal control systems, organizations relay on various 
mechanisms, such as sanctioning, monitoring, and rewarding (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 
2012; Puranam & Vanneste, 2009; Schweitzer, Ho, & Zhang, 2014). The implementation 
of formal controls may be endogenous, i.e. when managers make a choice to put controls 
in place, or exogenous, i.e. the source of controls is uncertain or beyond the authority of 
the managers (Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006).1 Endogenous controls have more 
unfavorable effects than exogenous controls because employees interpret their managers’ 
active choice to implement controls as a signal of distrust. This interpretation leads to 
employees’ negative responses to the presence of controls (Belot & Schröder, 2016; 
Christ, 2013; Christ, Sedatole, & Towry, 2012; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). However, prior 
studies do not examine how managers communicate the purpose of their choice to 
implement controls on employees. 
 My study investigates how the interaction of control source and control framing 
employees’ willingness to exert discretionary effort. Managers can frame the control 
implementation either for monitoring or coordinating purposes. A monitoring frame 
presents controls as a way to limit employees’ self-interested behavior, while a 
coordinating frame presents controls as a means to facilitate coordination and resource 
                                                
1 Controls imposed at a firm-wide level, rather than by immediate supervisors, are exogenous. 
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allocation between managers and employees (Liu, Wright, & Wu, 2015; Malhotra & 
Lumineau, 2011; Schepker, Oh, Martynov, & Poppo, 2014). Since framing provides 
social contexts by setting the expectations that people have about each other’s behavior in 
a relationship (Dreber, Ellingsen, Johannesson, & Rand, 2013; Ellingsen, Johannesson, 
Mollerstrom, & Munkhammar, 2012), I hypothesize that the employees’ perception of the 
manager’s choice to put controls in place depends on control framing. My study predicts 
that when managers implement controls framed for monitoring purposes, employees 
exert less effort compared to situations in which controls are exogenously imposed. I also 
predict that the results reverse if controls are framed for coordinating purposes. 
 I offer a social identity-based explanation for these expected interaction effects. A 
monitoring frame increases the salience of the conflict between the interests of managers 
and employees, preventing the development of a collective identity between them. When 
managers decide to implement the monitoring-framed controls, it reinforces the signal of 
managers protecting their self-interests. Hence, it is even harder for employees to 
transform their self-categorization from a personal identity to a collective identity 
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 2006; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
When employees’ personal identity is salient, they focus on maximizing their own 
interests by exerting low effort (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). In contrast, a coordinating 
frame emphasizes a concern for the shared interest between managers and employees 
(Kramer, 2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Essentially, a coordinating frame “collectivizes” 
group boundaries and promotes common gains (McGinn, Milkman, & Nöth, 2012; 
McGinn & Nöth, 2012). Furthermore, employees interpret managers’ choice for 
implementing coordinating-framed controls as managers’ noticeable effort to advance the 
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sense of collective, rather than merely personal, interests. As a result, managers’ choice 
for controls with a coordinating frame sends the contextual cues that build the collective 
identity between managers and employees. Accordingly, employees are more willing to 
engage in collective behavior by contributing more effort. 
 Existing studies have extensively investigated the relationship between controls 
and horizontal collective identity, the term that I use in this paper to describe the social 
ties among team members in an organization (see, e.g. Cardinaels & Yin, 2015; Tayler & 
Bloomfield, 2011; Towry, 2003). However, few have investigated the role of controls in 
building vertical collective identity, the term in my paper that characterizes the social ties 
between leaders and followers. 
 My study attains null results, which suggest that the interaction of control source 
and control framing has no effect on employee effort. Consistent with these null results, 
my study also provides no evidence of vertical collective identity taking a mediating role 
in this relationship. Supplementary analyses do provide the possible indication of 
interaction and mediating effects; even so, these suggestive hints must be interpreted with 
caution. However, I find surprising evidence: employees who infer that the manager’s 
reason of implementing monitoring-framed controls is for coordinating purposes exert 
more effort than employees in the coordinating-framed, endogenous controls, who share 
the same belief that the controls are indeed implemented for coordinating purposes. This 
surprising finding suggests how persuasive messages concerning the control 
implementation can backfire. Being aware that the manager has chosen to implement 
controls and that the controls improve the manager’s financial welfare, employees are 
skeptical to the persuasive messages conveyed by the coordinating frame, resulting in 
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effort aversion (Ert, Creary, & Bazerman, 2014). Interestingly, employees seem to agree 
that it is sometimes necessary for a manager to send stern messages in order to combat 
opportunistic behavior. This finding is consistent with Hardin (2004), who argue that 
showing distrust is welcomed in circumstances where opportunistic behavior is prevalent. 
Therefore, many employees view the monitoring frame of controls imposed by the 
manager as a means to facilitate coordination, thereby increasing the employees’ 
willingness to exert effort. 
 The null results of my study actually support Dreber et al. (2013), who argue that 
social framing effects do not exist in dictator games, which share the same nature of the 
social dilemma presented in this study: participants face a tension between maximizing 
self-interests or others’ benefit. The study of Dreber et al. (2013) ran an online 
experiment with an unusually large sample size (around 200 participants per treatment). 
Yet, their study still documents null results, leading them to conclude the absence of 
framing effects in dictator games. 
 However, I speculate another feasible explanation: both the study of Dreber et al. 
(2013) and mine recruited Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers as the participants 
of our experiments. AMT workers tend to exhibit social desirability bias (Antin & Shaw, 
2012), making them less sensitive to negative social frames. I suspect that AMT workers 
with high reputation, who are perceived as attentive participants, suffer from a higher 
level of social desirability bias due to their fear of getting their work rejected by the 
experimenter. In general, high social desirability bias drives participants to respond to 
questions in a manner that will presumably be viewed favorably by others. In this study, 
most participants across conditions claimed that the purpose of control is for 
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coordinating, not monitoring, implying that participants are reluctant to acknowledge that 
the control, albeit benefiting both managers and employees, is framed with a negative 
valence. Another problematic factor associated with AMT workers is that most of them 
have a lot of managerial or supervisory experience, making it hard to manipulate their 
perceptions of control framing. It is plausible that at their workplaces, those workers are 
responsible for framing control mechanisms and thereby can ‘detect’ the real purpose 
control. In summary, these null findings may warn future studies about the unintended 
drawbacks of recruiting AMT workers. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II develops the theoretical 
framework, whereas Section III delineates the hypothesis development. Section IV 
presents the research design. Section V presents the analysis and results. Section VI 
concludes and discusses opportunities for future research. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Social Identity Theory and Vertical Collective Identity in Organizational 
Settings 
 Social identity theory posits that individuals categorize themselves as having 
either a personal identity or a social identity. A personal identity defines one as a unique 
and distinct self, whereas a social identity categorizes one as in terms of relations to 
others (Hogg, 2003). When one’s sense of a personal identity is strong, the person’s 
choice is likely to serve self-interests (Kramer, 2006). In contrast, when individuals 
situate themselves in a social identity, they are more likely to make decisions in favor of 
collective interests (Y. Chen & Li, 2009; Kramer, 2006). A person may have multiple, 
co-occurring identities; the activation of a particular identity depends on social cues 
(Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 2006). A social identity can be made 
salient on the basis of perceived similar traits or common fate (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; 
Wit & Kerr, 2002).  
 Prior research refines the distinctions above by describing two levels of social 
identities: relational and collective identities. A relational identity views oneself as an 
interconnected partner in interpersonal and interdependent relationships (Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996; Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999). A relational identity also defines roles 
within those relationships; for example, the relationship between child-parent, student-
teacher, and subordinate-leader. A collective identity, in contrast, identifies one as a 
member of a group. A collective identity is also a basis for differentiating in-group 
members from out-group members (Gaertner et al., 2012; Kramer, 2006). 
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 Social identity theory is particularly relevant to organizational settings because 
organizations often face social dilemmas in which there is a conflict between individual 
and collective interests. In addition, social identity can also dramatically shape people’s 
economic behavior beyond financial incentives (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). Since leaders 
of organizations strive to mobilize their employees to pursue collective goals, it is crucial 
for leaders to instill collective mindsets in their employees. Leaders could achieve this 
objective by cultivating the sense of shared social identity between themselves and 
employees (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Hogg, 2001; Steffens, Haslam, 
Reicher, et al., 2014). In this paper, I term shared social identity between leaders and 
employees as vertical collective identity.  
 Prior studies suggest that vertical collective identity is stronger when employees 
believe that leaders share similar attributes with them or when they stand up for 
employees’ interests (Hogg, 2001; Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014; Steffens, 
Mols, Haslam, & Okimoto, 2016). The strength of vertical collective identity is also 
enhanced when leaders express confidence in the capabilities of their team (Fransen et 
al., 2015). Importantly, the key mechanism that cultivates a vertical collective identity is 
communication strategies that emphasize inclusive language or collective pronouns 
(Seyranian, 2014; Steffens & Haslam, 2013). The strength of vertical collective identity 
has a significant effect on employees’ perception of leader charisma and their experience 
in sharing not only social, but also personal connections with their leaders (Molenberghs, 
Prochilo, Steffens, Zacher, & Haslam, 2015; Steffens, Haslam, & Reicher, 2014). 
Specifically, strong vertical collective identity increases employees’ trust in and 
commitment to their leaders (Giessner, van Knippenberg, van Ginkel, & Sleebos, 2013; 
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Steffens et al., 2016). Accordingly, when employees share strong vertical collective 
identity with their leaders, the employees are more willing to engage in behaviors that 
benefit collective interests, such as contributing more to common resources (Kramer & 
Brewer, 1984; Wit & Kerr, 2002) or demonstrating more altruistic actions (Y. Chen & Li, 
2009). Collectively, prior work suggests that, when vertical collective identity is strong, 
employees exert more effort that increases the welfare of their leaders as well as their in-
group members.  
 Research in accounting has increasingly explored the relationship between 
management control systems and social identities, particularly horizontal collective 
identity, i.e. the term I use to describe social ties among group members. Towry (2003) 
finds that the effectiveness of control structures depends on the strength of horizontal 
collective identity. In addition, formal controls in the form of reward system designs 
could also affect the formation of horizontal collective identity (C. X. Chen, Williamson, 
& Zhou, 2012). However, few studies have addressed the relationship between controls 
and vertical collective identity. Since theories and findings in horizontal relations may 
not extend to vertical relations (Luft, 2016), it would be valuable to further investigate 
how controls shape and are shaped by vertical collective identity. 
 Prior literature suggests various factors that determine the development and 
reinforcement of vertical collective identity. The first factor is prototypicality, which 
means that a leader is viewed as a prototypical (or representative) of a shared identity 
within a group (Hogg, 2003; Steffens, Haslam, & Reicher, 2014; Steffens, Haslam, 
Reicher, et al., 2014; D. van Knippenberg, 2011). In other words, a leader is seen either 
as “being one of us” (Hogg, 2003) or as “an exemplary member in this group” (Steffens, 
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Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014). A high prototypical leader is viewed as the person who 
embodies core attributes that other, less prototypical members are expected to conform 
(Fransen et al., 2015; Giessner et al., 2013; Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014). The 
prototypicality of a leader can be enhanced when the leader is elected by the group rather 
than externally appointed (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003).  
 The second factor that influences the strength of vertical collective identity is the 
salience of social boundary (Kramer, 2006; Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014). A 
leader should develop structures, practices, rituals, and core values as well as norms that 
set the boundary of group membership and create a sense of “us” (Steffens, Haslam, 
Reicher, et al., 2014). Another way for leaders to enhance the sense of “us” is by showing 
confidence in the group’s success when performing group-oriented behavior (Fransen et 
al., 2015). In addition, social attraction is another important factor that promotes vertical 
collective identity because socially attractive leaders can make their subordinates readily 
comply with their requests and commands (Hogg, 2003). Social attraction might be 
derived from charismatic leadership (Shamir, Zakay, Breinin, & Popper, 1998); however, 
personal characteristics are not the sole determinant of a leader’s social attraction. 
Instead, leaders can become “socialized charismatic” by demonstrating behavior that 
promotes group interests (Steffens et al., 2016). In other words, leaders are perceived to 
be “in-group champions” by prioritizing the group-oriented goals over personal or out-
group interests (Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014). 
 Finally, when a leader wishes to redefine or realign vertical collective identity, 
the leader should engage in social identity framing (Seyranian, 2014). Seyranian (2014) 
argues that social identity framing rests on the power of communication strategies that 
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intend to immerse subordinates into three framing phases. The first phase (“social 
identity unfreezing”) is to de-link subordinates from the current social identity. The 
second phase (“social identity moving”) presents the vision of the new identity, whereas 
the third phase (“social identity freezing”) reaffirms the new identity (Seyranian, 2014). 
All three phases can be accomplished by using inclusive language that emphasizes the 
intergroup bias (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990; Seyranian, 2014). 
Specifically, inclusive language draws a distinction between the in-group and the out-
group membership status (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Perdue et al., 1990), which can be 
done by using different collective pronouns, such as “we” versus “they” (Gustafsson 
Sendén, Lindholm, & Sikström, 2013; Perdue et al., 1990). During the first phase, i.e. 
social identity unfreezing, inclusive language promotes similarity and commonality 
between leaders and their subordinates. During the second phase, i.e. social identity 
moving, inclusive language negates the previous framing of social identity (Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996; Seyranian, 2014). Essentially, using the language that emphasizes the out-
group membership status can evoke a negative impression toward the previous framing of 
social identity (Gustafsson Sendén et al., 2013; Lee, Adair, Mannix, & Kim, 2012; 
Perdue et al., 1990). Finally, during the third phase, i.e. social identity freezing, leaders 
use inclusive language that stresses the positive attributes of the newly framed social 
identity (Fransen et al., 2015; Seyranian, 2014). Overall, these studies highlight the 




2.2. Comparison between Leader-Member Exchange Theory and Social Identity 
Theory 
 Besides social identity theory, another significant theory that focuses on vertical 
relations is Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory. LMX theory examines the leader-
subordinate relationships at interpersonal levels (Lord et al., 1999). Hence, the theory 
emphasizes the role of relational self in leader-subordinate relationships (Gaertner et al., 
2012; Lord, Gatti, & Chui, 2016). LMX theory argues that leaders and subordinates can 
build their relationships based on mutual trust and respect (high-quality LMX 
relationships) or rely on formal employment contracts (low-quality LMX relationships). 
High-quality LMX relationships are more likely to increase subordinates’ motivation 
(Graen, Novak, & Sommerkamp, 1982). Prior work shows that imposing control on high 
LMX relationships will hurt subordinates’ perception of the relationship quality; thereby 
leading subordinates to exert less effort. While high-quality LMX relationships are 
usually sought after in organizational settings, prior literature also finds that subordinates 
who perceive higher-quality relationships with their leader are more willing to undermine 
control system by complying to their manager’s request for submitting biased accounting 
estimates (Jollineau, Vance, & Webb, 2012). In short, studies that rely on LMX theory 
suggest that the quality of LMX relationships affects the effectiveness of control systems 
in organizations. 
 However, the main weakness of LMX theory is that because it focuses on dyadic 
relationships; it offers limited predictions at the group or social-network levels (Hogg et 
al., 2005). LMX theory argues that leaders can cultivate high-quality dyadic relationships 
with different subordinates in isolation from other dyadic relationships (Hogg et al., 
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2005). In other words, leaders are encouraged to personalize their dyadic relationships 
that can cater to each subordinate’ distinct and individual characteristics. Since LMX 
theory assumes that subordinates perceive the relationship quality in an absolute sense, 
LMX theory does not take into account how subordinates evaluate their relationships 
with their leader relative to the relationship quality of other subordinates with the same 
leader. 
 Social identity theory addresses the limitation of LMX theory by shifting the 
focus of leadership from interpersonal levels to group and collective levels (Hogg & van 
Knippenberg, 2003; Lord et al., 2016). By exploring leader-subordinate relationships 
with a broader lens, social identity theory argues that fairness and justice concerns 
influence leader-subordinate relationships (Hogg et al., 2005). For example, LMX theory 
cannot clearly predict whether showing favoritism will hurt leader-subordinate 
relationships. With regard to the relationship between the leader and the favored 
subordinate, LMX theory view it as an example of a high-quality LMX relationship. 
However, social identity theory argues that playing favorites undermines the 
development of the social identity shared between leaders and subordinates. Overall 
social identity theory suggests that favoritism results in low-quality relationships. 
 In addition, social identity theory points out that effective leadership depends on 
how leaders strongly identify with their subordinates as a group (Hogg, 2001). Prior 
literature (Hogg, 2001; Hogg et al., 2005) compares LMX theory with social identity 
theory and finds that personalized leader-subordinate relationships matter when group 
membership is weak or not salient. In contrast, high salience groups prefer a 
depersonalized leadership style than a personalized one (Hogg et al., 2005). Because 
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social identity theory argues that leader group prototypicality is essential to build strong 
relationships between leaders and subordinates, the theory predicts that the source of 
leader selection (i.e. in-group versus out-group leaders) matters in building strong 
relationships between leaders and subordinates (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003). LMX 
theory, in contrast, is silent concerning the importance of the source of leader selection. 
Collectively, leadership research provides evidence that social identity theory 
complements LMX theory by broadening the definition of high-quality leader-
subordinate relationships.  
 
2.3. Control Framing 
 Controls play multiple functions in organizational settings. First, controls can 
monitor and mitigate threats of opportunistic behavior from organizational members (Liu 
et al., 2015; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Patterson & Smith, 2007). In other words, 
controls related to monitoring purposes are designed to safeguard assets and limit 
potential self-interested actions that are detrimental to the organization. Alternatively, 
controls can serve as a coordination mechanism; they make it easier for organizational 
members to understand each other’s role when working together (Gulati, Lawrence, & 
Puranam, 2005; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Hence, controls help members understand 
that their actions are interdependent (Dekker, 2004; Gulati et al., 2005; Nicolaou, 
Sedatole, & Lankton, 2011). In essence, controls for coordinating purposes could 
improve resource allocation and facilitate collaboration (Liu et al., 2015; Malhotra & 
Lumineau, 2011; Nicolaou et al., 2011).  
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 While controls for monitoring purposes could promote compliance (Schweitzer et 
al., 2014), monitoring controls also signal distrust of other party’s intention. Hence, 
monitoring controls hurt trust development among members (Malhotra & Lumineau, 
2011; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). Accordingly, monitoring controls could erode 
cooperative behavior (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). In addition, 
monitoring controls implemented as penalty contracts increase employees’ effort 
(Hannan, Hoffman, & Moser, 2005); however, the effect diminishes in the situations that 
call for discretionary effort (Christ, Sedatole, et al., 2012; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). 
Employees also respond strategically to monitoring controls. When they anticipate that 
they will not be monitored, they behave opportunistically (Schweitzer et al., 2014). The 
favorable impact of monitoring controls is that the controls promote the employees’ 
perception of fairness (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993). Specifically, employees view 
monitoring controls as an unbiased tool in performance appraisal systems (Long, 
Bendersky, & Morrill, 2011; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993).  
 Since controls for coordinating purposes facilitate collaboration, coordinating 
controls build trust (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Nicolaou et al., 2011) and cooperative 
behavior (Coletti et al., 2005; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Coordinating controls also 
foster joint learning (Dekker, 2004) and the mutual adaptability for coping with 
fluctuations in business pressures or technology (Gulati et al., 2005). Nonetheless, a 
heavy-handed implementation of coordinating controls could backfire because it sends 
conflicting signals. The reason is that coordinating controls promote collaboration 
between managers and employees, while strong controls imply that managers do not trust 
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their employees. As a result, the conflicting signals in such controls could provoke 
employees to retaliate by increasing dishonest behavior (Liu et al., 2015).  
 Prior studies suggest that both monitoring and coordinating functions of controls 
are necessary to organizational success (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Dekker, 2004; Gulati et 
al., 2005; Nicolaou et al., 2011). Some studies argue that the control mechanisms for 
monitoring purposes differ from the mechanisms for coordinating purposes in design 
(Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011) or timing (Naranjo‐Gil & Hartmann, 2006). However, 
other studies suggest that control framing allows for the same control policies to work as 
either monitoring or coordinating controls (Liu et al., 2015; Malhotra, 2012; McGinn & 
Nöth, 2012). 
 Note that prior work does not suggest that organizations should always prefer 
controls with a coordinating frame to controls with a monitoring frame. Monitoring and 
coordinating functions play complementary roles in ensuring the effectiveness of controls 
(see, e.g., Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange & 
Kuhlman, 1994). In addition, controls with a coordinating frame can result in negative 
consequences; for instance, when the implementation of coordinating controls is 
stringent, the controls invoke an increase in employees’ unethical behavior (Liu et al., 
2015). Similarly, a strong bond between managers and employees may persuade 
employees to condone managers’ misreporting (Jollineau et al., 2012). 
 Framing activities also demonstrate the power of communication (Entman, 1993; 
McGinn & Nöth, 2012); framing essentially shapes one’s interpretation of a situation by 
“selecting certain aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient in a 
communication text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Framing can significantly affect behaviors of 
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parties involved in interactive economic activities (McGinn et al., 2012). Indeed, in 
control settings, managers could frame controls by communicating the purpose of 
controls to employees. Therefore, managers’ use of framing plays a critical role in the 
effectiveness of control mechanisms because the framing affects employees’ responses to 
the presence of controls (Liu et al., 2015; Malhotra, 2012; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). 
 
2.4. Control Source 
 Prior studies argue that in manager-employee relationships, employees display 
control aversion because controls restrict their autonomy (Christ, Sedatole, et al., 2012; 
Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). In addition, employees perceive their manager’s decision to 
implement controls as a signal of distrust (Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). 
Accordingly, they retaliate by either exerting low effort (Belot & Schröder, 2016; Christ, 
2013; Christ, Sedatole, et al., 2012; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002) or conducting 
opportunistic behavior (Schweitzer et al., 2014). In contrast, employees exhibit less 
dysfunctional behavior when no formal control mechanism is present (Belot & Schröder, 
2016; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Schweitzer et al., 2014) or when the controls are 
imposed exogenously, i.e. the source of control implementation does not come from the 
managers’ authority. In other words, endogenous controls – i.e. controls that come from 
the managers’ authority to implement them – would cause detrimental effects. The issues 
of endogenous controls have important practical implications because the implementation 
of exogenous controls is more costly in real-world settings (Charness & Ellman, 2016). 
 The negative effects of endogenous controls are heightened when managers 
decide to put controls in place by using penalty rather than bonus contracts (Christ, 
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Sedatole, et al., 2012). Investigating the settings that demand honest reporting, Cardinaels 
and Yin (2015) argue that when managers decide to use truth-telling incentive contracts 
instead of fixed-wage contracts, they could signal distrust to their employees. 
Furthermore, if managers decide to implement truth-telling incentive contracts after 
observing employees’ reporting behavior, an employee could infer that other employees, 
in general, report dishonestly. Accordingly, the employee may conform to this self-
interested norm (Cardinaels & Yin, 2015). Collectively, these studies suggest adverse 
consequences of endogenous controls. 
 Interestingly, prior studies also find that the moral legitimacy, or the interpreted 
purpose, of endogenous controls determines whether the controls result in adverse 
consequences or not. In social settings that involve public goods and thereby punishing 
“free-riders” is considered morally legitimate, endogenous controls do not backfire (Fehr 
& Rockenbach, 2003). Likewise, endogenous controls do not trigger negative reactions 
when distrust is a rational and expected behavior (Hardin, 2004). When opportunism is a 
norm and thereby the presence of endogenous controls is perceived necessary to foster 
reciprocity, endogenous controls are welcomed (Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011). 
Collectively, these studies indicate that the behavioral impacts of control source depend 
on people’s interpretation of the purpose of controls. 
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Main Predictions 
3.1.1. Interactive Effects of Control Source and Control Framing on Vertical 
Collective Identity and Employee Effort 
 Managers can use control framing to communicate their intent of implementing 
controls either for monitoring or coordinating purposes (Liu et al., 2015). At the same 
time, the managers’ choice to implement controls also implies their intent (Christ, 2013; 
Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). Since the prior literature suggests that the manager’s both stated 
and implied intent to implement controls influence the development of vertical collective 
identity, I propose that the interaction of control source and control framing can serve a 
role for building or destroying vertical collective identity. Specifically, I argue that that 
control framing might work as the mechanism of social identity framing in manager-
employee relationships. 
 When controls are framed for monitoring purposes, the controls communicate the 
threat of employees’ self-interests to managers’ self-interests (Liu et al., 2015; Lumineau 
& Malhotra, 2011). Importantly, controls with a monitoring frame imply that managers 
and employees share distinct self-identities, making each other’s personal identity salient 
(Kramer, 2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Accordingly, controls with a monitoring frame 
influence employees to construe themselves in their personal identities rather than in a 





Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 I predict that when the implementation of controls with a monitoring frame comes  
from the managers’ active choice, it makes the managers’ intent to protect their self-
interests more salient (Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). As a result, the endogenous 
controls with a monitoring frame exacerbate the perceived division of interests between 
managers and employees. In contrast, considering that employees react to exogenous 
controls less negatively (Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006), I predict that the salience 
of the conflict lessens when controls with a monitoring frame are imposed exogenously.  
 When a person’s personal identity is salient, the person is less willing to engage in 
behavior that promotes collective interest (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer, 
1984). In organizational settings, this phenomenon translates to employees’ willingness 
to exert discretionary effort. Therefore, I summarize my predictions as follows: 
H1A: When controls are framed for monitoring purposes, employees exert lower 
effort in endogenous controls than in exogenous controls.  
 
H1B: When controls are framed for monitoring purposes, endogenous controls 
lead to a weaker vertical collective identity than exogenous controls. 
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H1C: Vertical collective identity mediates the effect of controls on employees’ 
effort. Specifically, a strong (weak) vertical collective identity leads to high 
(low) effort. 
 I predict that controls with a coordinating frame generate opposite outcomes. 
Essentially, a coordinating frame “collectivizes” group boundaries and promotes common 
gains (McGinn et al., 2012; McGinn & Nöth, 2012). When controls are framed for 
coordinating purposes, the controls communicate shared interests between managers and 
employees (Gulati et al., 2005; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Prior research also finds 
that controls with a coordinating frame are unlikely to hurt trust (Lumineau & Malhotra, 
2011; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Hence, controls with a coordinating frame activate 
the development of vertical collective identity (Kramer, 2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the Predicted Interaction Effect (H1 and H2) 
 
 
 In addition, when controls with a coordinating frame are imposed endogenously, 
































research suggests that collective-oriented messages would be more persuasive to 
followers when the messages come from an in-group, rather than out-group, leader 
(Molenberghs et al., 2015). In my setting, I predict that the managers’ active choice to 
implement controls with a coordinating frame heightens vertical collective identity. 
Hence, employees are more willing to exert effort. In contrast, when controls are imposed 
exogenously, the controls do not demonstrate managers’ attempt to advance common 
interests, weakening vertical collective identity and employee effort. Therefore, I predict 
that: 
H2A: When controls are framed for coordinating purposes, employees exert 
higher effort in endogenous controls than in exogenous controls. 
 
H2B: When controls are framed for coordinating purposes, endogenous controls 
lead to a stronger vertical collective identity than exogenous controls. 
 
H2C: Vertical collective identity mediates the effect of controls on employees’ 




3.2. Additional Predictions 
3.2.1. Similarities between Controls without Stated Purposes and Controls with a 
Monitoring Frame 
 When investigating the effects of controls on employee behavior, some prior 
studies use parsimonious designs that do not allow managers to communicate the reason 
of control implementation (see, e.g. Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006).3 The findings 
of those studies conclude adverse effects of controls. However, I argue that the absence 
                                                
2 H1C and H2C are identical. The duplication is necessary in order to maintain the logical consistency of 
H1 and H2. 
3 Such designs are equivalent to real-world settings in which controls are in place but neither the firm nor 
managers specify the purpose of control implementation. 
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of reasoning for control implementation, rather than a mere presence of controls, might 
explain those negative results.  
 The literature in psychology suggests that when the reason of control 
implementation is unstated, individuals view the presence of controls suspiciously, 
thinking that the person responsible for the control implementation does not trust them 
(Enzle & Anderson, 1993). In addition, the absence of vertical communication in general 
hurts the quality of manager-employee relationships because the vertical communication 
is crucial for managers to foster attachment and cohesiveness (Postmes, Tanis, & de Wit, 
2001). Accordingly, the existence of vertical communication is a necessary condition to 
build vertical collective identity (Postmes et al., 2001; Seyranian, 2014; Steffens & 
Haslam, 2013).  
 Since employees suspect their managers’ intention in response to the presence of 
controls without managers’ explanation about the control purposes, I argue that 
employees would perceive the reason behind the presence of controls is for monitoring 
purposes. Building on my earlier predictions above, I further argue that the interaction 
between controls without reasoning for implementation and control source would lead to 
the similar effects as in the interaction between controls with a monitoring frame and 
control source. Specifically, I predict the following:  
H3A: When controls are present without stating the reasoning for implementation 
(controls without a frame, hereafter), employees are more likely to infer that 
the controls are intended for monitoring rather than for coordinating 
purposes. 
 
H3B: When controls without a frame are in place, employees exert lower effort in 
endogenous controls than in exogenous controls.  
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H3C: Vertical collective identity mediates the effect of controls on employees’ 
effort. Specifically, when controls without a frame are in place, endogenous 






4. RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
4.1. Main Experiment 
4.1.1. Experimental Design 
 In this study, I run an experiment with a 3 × 3 between-participants design, in 
which I manipulate control source (unknown source, endogenous, or exogenous) and 
control framing (no frame, monitoring frame, or coordinating frame). The presence of 
cells that interact with unknown source or no frame conditions allows me to detect the 
incremental effects of my main treatments. 
 
Figure 3: Complete Experimental Design 
 
 
 My experiment structure resembles the design by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), which 
is a one-shot principal-agent game. A one-shot game allows studying the effects of 
controls in a parsimonious fashion because this design mitigates potential confounds, 
such as reputation building or reciprocity, that might occur in a multiple-rounds design 
(Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Tayler & Bloomfield, 2011).  
 I randomly assign participants to one of the nine treatments. Each participant 
assumes a role of an employee to an anonymous manager of Division X in Company 
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PQR; hence, each condition has one manager that supervises multiple employees.4 In the 
beginning of the experiment, each participant receives an endowment of 65 points.5 The 
endowment is worth 65 cents. Participants can transfer partial or all points to their 
managers; the transfer represents employee effort. Participants are informed that the 
welfare of themselves, their division, as well as their manager may improve if they exert 
more effort. Participants answer several comprehension checks to ensure that they have 
understood the compensation scheme. They cannot proceed to the next session prior to 
answering all questions correctly. 
 After completing the comprehension checks, participants are informed that every 
condition has a control in place that requires participants to transfer at least 5 points to the 
manager. Transferring mere five points can be considered a weak control, which is a 
powerful condition to detect the variability in the participants’ effort (Falk & Kosfeld, 
2006). When a control is strong, participants are forced to exert high effort, making it 
difficult to observe negative consequences (if any) of control implementation on effort 
(Belot & Schröder, 2016; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Tyran & Feld, 2006). 
 Before making a transfer, depending on the condition, participants are informed 
whether the control is present either because of their manager’s decision or because of 
their company’s policy, which is beyond the manager’s authority. Participants are also 
informed that the reasoning behind control implementation is for monitoring or 
coordinating purposes (details are explained below). After making a transfer, participants 
fill out a series of post-experimental questions related to manipulation checks, their 
                                                
4 Participants are told that the manager is real, not fictitious, person. 
5 To mitigate the risk of fairness perceptions, I do not inform participants about their manager’s initial 
endowment. The manager receives zero points as an initial endowment. 
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perceptions of vertical collective identity, intrinsic motivation, social value orientation, 
and demographic information. 
 
4.1.2. Participants 
 I recruit all participants using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) online 
platform. For each condition, I recruit around 30 workers as employees, so the total 
number of participants is 271 workers; 55% of participants are male. On average, the 
participants have 16 years of work experience and are 37 years old. Sixty-one percent of 
participants have supervisory or managerial experience and the average length of 
supervisory experience is 6 years. 
 I recruit the AMT workers who are located in the United States and consider 
English as their native language. The minimum age of participants is 18 years old. Each 
participant earns a show-up fee of $1.50. Participants are also told that they can earn a 
possible bonus pay up to $1.45.6 In addition, I employ a doctoral student, who is also an 
AMT user, as a confederate who assumes the manager role. Employing a real confederate 
allows me to avoid having a fictitious manager and enables me to tell the participants that 
their transfer decisions have real economic consequences to their manager. The 
confederate earns 10% of the total points transferred by participants from all nine 
conditions. The total number of points transferred by all participants is 10,675 points 
(equivalent to $106.75). Hence, the confederate earns $10.68 from this study. Again, to 
mitigate the risk of fairness perceptions (see footnote 6), the experimental materials do 
                                                
6 More discussion about the possible bonus pay can be found at Section 4.1.4, Dependent and Mediating 
Variables. 
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tell participants about the details of this arrangement. Participants are only told that 
transferring more points allows their manager to earn higher bonus pay. 
 
Qualifications and Quality Control of AMT Workers 
 The AMT site has been increasingly popular among accounting studies because it 
provides behavioral researchers convenient access to a large participant pool at a low 
cost. However, data quality is one of the major concerns facing experimental studies that 
capitalize on the AMT site to recruit participants. The biggest issue is that AMT workers 
may not be attentive respondents given the fact that internet-based studies lose some 
experimental controls provided by the traditional laboratory settings. Prior studies 
suggest two measures to improve data quality: approval ratings and instructional 
manipulation checks. First, restricting participation to AMT workers with high reputation 
(above 95% approval rating) is effective to combat the data quality issues (Peer, 
Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014). Workers with high reputation are motivated to pay close 
attention to the experiment’s instructions due to their fear of having their work 
submission rejected, thereby hurting their approval ratings. Second, instructional 
manipulation checks allow researchers to filter out participants who fail to follow 
instructions. Instruction manipulation checks, often called as “trap questions”, are special 
attention checks that instruct participants to ignore the standard response format and 
submit a non-intuitive response instead (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). 
This special command is hidden in a large block of instruction; hence, it is likely that 
inattentive respondents miss the command. 
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 I include both strategies in my experimental design in order to obtain quality data. 
First, participants of this study have to meet the following eligibility criteria: (1) their 
approval rates of prior tasks should be above 98% and (2) the number of prior tasks 
completed in the AMT platform is above than 10,000 tasks. The AMT platform makes it 
possible for me to impose these qualifications before the workers begin my task. Second, 
I place one instructional manipulation check as the second to last question of my 
experimental tasks. The instructional manipulation check tells participants that failure to 
follow the special instruction embedded in this check will make them lose their bonus 
pay. Consistent with the expectation that workers with high reputation complete tasks 
attentively, only one out of 271 workers failed the instructional manipulation.7  
 
4.1.3. Independent Variables 
Control Source 
 To manipulate the level of control source, I develop scripts that tell participants 
about who is responsible for the control implementation. The script for the endogenous-
source condition prescribes that the manager has the authority to implement a control that 
requires employees to transfer at least five points, and that the manager has decided to do 
so. In contrast, the script for the exogenous-source condition tells participants that the 
company’s executive management has decided to implement the control, and this 
decision is beyond the manager’s authority. The unknown-source condition does not 
provide participants the information about the responsible party.  
                                                
7 Results are unchanged if the responses of this worker is included; therefore, I retain all participants’ 
responses in my dataset. 
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 The scripts also use linguistic variations to emphasize different control sources. 
Specifically, prior findings suggest that pronouns reinforce and perpetuate perceptions 
about relationships (see, e.g., Fitzsimons & Kay, 2004; Gustafsson Sendén et al., 2013; 
Perdue et al., 1990; Sela, Wheeler, & Sarial-Abi, 2012; Tu, Shaw, & Fishbach, 2016). On 
the one hand, the pronoun “I” or “my” acknowledges ownership (Newman, Pennebaker, 
Berry, & Richards, 2003); therefore, these pronouns reinforce the message that the source 
of control is endogenous. On the other hand, since the pronoun “they” or “their” shifts 
ownership to another party, these pronouns can be used to emphasize the exogenous 
source of controls (Gustafsson Sendén et al., 2013; Perdue et al., 1990). Hence, I include 
10 words of “I” or “my” and 10 words of “they” or “their” in the endogenous-control and 
the exogenous-control” conditions, respectively. 
 
Control Framing 
 Similar to the study of Liu et al. (2015), I manipulate the level of control framing 
by informing participants about the reasoning behind control implementation. In the 
monitoring-frame condition, participants are told that the purpose of control 
implementation is “to prevent employees from producing transferring fewer resources 
than the division needs.” Essentially, participants are informed that the control is 
designed to restrict the employees’ opportunities to keep all resources for themselves. In 
contrast, the script for the coordinating-frame condition tells participants that the purpose 
of control implementation is “to optimize resource allocation and coordinate resources 
more efficiently.” The script for the no-frame condition” does not inform participants 
about the purpose of control implementation. 
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 In addition, I rely on pronoun variations again to enhance the perceived purposes 
of control implementation. Specifically, the pronoun “you” or “your” reinforces the 
perception of distant relationships and the assignment of blame (Olekalns, Brett, & 
Donohue, 2010; Seider, Hirschberger, Nelson, & Levenson, 2009). Essentially, the 
pronoun “you” or “your” perpetuates the need for monitoring others’ behavior. 
Therefore, I include 10 words of the pronoun “you” or “your” in the script for the 
monitoring-frame condition. In contrast, because the pronoun “we”, “us”, or “our” 
perpetuates the perception of close relationships and togetherness (Fitzsimons & Kay, 
2004; Perdue et al., 1990), these pronouns emphasize the message of collaboration. In the 
monitoring-frame condition, I include 10 words of the pronoun “we”, “us”, or “our.” The 
overview of the experimental instrument is provided in Appendix.  
 
4.1.4. Dependent and Mediating Variables 
 Baiman (1982) defines that the operationalization of effort has to meet the 
following criteria: (a) effort is costly to the agent; (b) the cost of effort increases with the 
level of effort; (c) an increase in agent’s effort results in a gain of welfare for both the 
principal and the agent; and (d) the agent experiences disutility from choosing a higher 
effort level. To ensure that I follow the criteria above, I measure effort as my dependent 
variable (Employee Effort) based on the number of points transferred. As mentioned 
earlier, participants are told that they can demonstrate their effort level by contributing 
partial or all points of their endowment to their division (the total points of initial 
endowment: 65 points, which is worth $0.65). Specifically, participants can choose their 
effort level from 5 to 65 points, and they can increase the contribution of their effort by 
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increments of 5 points. The remaining points of endowment after contribution is 
converted to be real dollars and paid as a bonus pay. Consequently, contributing more 
points is costly for participants because it will reduce the amount of their bonus pay. 
 At the same time, participants are also informed that exerting more effort will 
allow them to achieve a high outcome. Adapting from the study of Hannan et al. (2005), I 
link the cost of effort to the probability of achieving the high outcome. Participants are 
told that increasing their level of effort by 5 points will raise their chance by 5% to earn 
an extra bonus pay of $0.80. A lottery will be drawn based on the probability 
corresponding to one’s effort level choice. Before choosing their effort levels, 
participants review a table that shows the probability of winning the extra bonus of $0.80 
for each of the 13 possible effort level choices. The table is the part of the experimental 
materials provided in Appendix. 
 After measuring the dependent variable, I also measure the mediating variable, 
Vertical Collective Identity in post-experimental questions. I use the Inclusion of Other in 
the Self (IOS) scale (Aron et al., 2004) as the main indicator of Vertical Collective 
Identity. The IOS Scale is a widely used measure for gauging the closeness of a 
relationship and appears to be robust in terms of reliability, as well as the predictive 
validity (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Aron et al., 2004).  
 I also develop the supporting indicator of Vertical Collective Identity based on 
eight questions adapted from prior literature (Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014; B. 
van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). The questionnaire uses a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alpha of 
the eight items is 0.96. I also run the factor analysis to evaluate the convergent and 
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divergent validity of this supporting measure. The factor analysis generates only one 
factor with eigenvalues greater than 1 (6.31), which explain around 78.87% of the overall 
variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measured of sampling adequacy is high (0.96). 
Overall, the results indicate that the items are capable of measuring vertical collective 
identity as a distinct construct. 
 
Potential Covariates 
 I measure two potential covariates in this study. First, as prior literature suggests 
that intrinsic motivation is the main driver of effort (Ryan & Deci, 2000), I measure the 
participants’ levels of their overall intrinsic motivation (Intrinsic Motivation). Adapting 
from the study of Elliot and Harackiewicz (1994), I develop five question items as the 
measure of intrinsic motivation. The Cronbach’s alpha of these five items is 0.83, 
indicating high internal consistency. The factor analysis supports the divergent and 
convergent validity of the construct: it generates only one factor with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1 (3.05) and explains 61% of the variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
of sampling adequacy is high (0.83).  
 Second, I measure the participants’ social value orientation (Social Orientation). 
Individuals with a high prosocial orientation likely develop close relationships and shared 
identities with others (De Cremer, Van Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & Van Leeuwen, 2008); 
consequently, the degree of social orientation affects the strength of vertical collective 
identity. To measure Social Orientation, I utilize nine items of decomposed games 
developed by Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, and Joireman (1997). These measures are 
well validated in psychology research (see, e.g. Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange 
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& Kuhlman, 1994). Each item asks participants to choose one among three options; each 
option gives participants the different proportion of a hypothetical payoff for oneself and 
another person. These options represent three groups of social value orientations (in the 
order of prosocial degree): competitive, individualistic, and prosocial orientations. An 
individual is categorized as competitive, individualistic, or prosocial if this person selects 
at least six choices out of nine items that belong to a particular social orientation group. 
 
Additional Measures 
 I evaluate the participants’ perceptions of control source and control framing in 
the post-experimental questions. Both Perceived Control Source and Perceived Control 
Frame serve as attention checks of the main conditions of this study. In addition, 
Perceived Control Frame is used to test Hypothesis 3A. Participants respond to one item 
that measures Perceived Control Frame. Participants are invited to choose between 
Option A (“I think the policy is designed to monitor and restrict employees’ behavior”) 
and Option B (“I think the policy is designed to facilitate the coordination of employees’ 
effort”). Similarly, participants respond to one item that measures Perceived Control 
Source. I elicit participants’ interpretation regarding the source of control by asking them 
to indicate who is responsible for the implementation of control: (a) their manager; (b) 
executive management; or (c) “the text does not provide information”. 
 
4.2. Pilot Testing 
 I ran multiple rounds of pilot testing to refine the experimental task, manipulation 
checks, the manipulated and measured variables, and other post-experimental questions. 
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First, 50 Masters of Accounting (MAcc) students reviewed and completed the pilot test. 
Ninety percent of students have work experience (average: 5 years of experience; 
median: 4 years) and 42% of students have experience in supervising subordinates 
(average: 1.4 years of experience). The first pilot test covered six conditions: Endogenous 
Source/Monitoring Frame, Exogenous Source/Monitoring Frame, Endogenous 
Source/Coordinating Frame, Exogenous Source/Coordinating Frame, Endogenous 
Source/No Frame, and Exogenous Source/No Frame.  
 I conducted the second and the final pilot tests with nine and six AMT workers, 
respectively. Based on their responses, I adjusted the compensation amount and refined 





5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1. Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort and Vertical Collective Identity 
Across Conditions 
 In Table 1, I present descriptive statistics of the number of points transferred 
(Employee Effort) across all conditions. Figure 4 displays the means plot for all 
conditions. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort (All Conditions) 
 
Control Framing 









n = 30 
38.83 
(23.33) 
n = 30 
34.67 
(23.34) 




n = 30 
41.17 
(24.41) 
n = 30 
36.50 
(26.53) 




n = 30 
37.26 
(23.34) 
n = 31 
43.83 
(23.55) 










Figure 4: Means Plot of Employee Effort (All Conditions) 
 
  
 When the control frame is absent, the pattern of results shown in Figure 4 is 
consistent with the findings of prior literature: the endogenous control yields lower effort 
compared to effort level in the conditions where the control source is not known or the 
control source is exogenous. However, the patterns of results of main treatments do not 
appear to support my predictions: participants in the Exogenous Source/Monitoring 
condition seem to exert lower effort than those in the control group or in the Endogenous 
Source/Monitoring condition, a direction that contradicts my first hypothesis. 
 Also, the average effort of the Endogenous/Coordinating condition appears to be 
lower than the average effort of the Exogenous/Coordinating condition or, surprisingly, 
that of the Endogenous Source/Monitoring Condition. Overall, the patterns of results are 
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 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the scores of vertical collective identity 
on all conditions. Figure 5 plots the patterns of results.8 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Collective Identity (All Conditions) 
 
Control Framing 









n = 30 
2.83 
(1.70) 
n = 30 
3.27 
(1.60) 




n = 30 
2.67 
(1.42) 
n = 30 
2.53 
(1.46) 




n = 30 
3.10 
(1.54) 
n = 31 
3.40 
(1.45) 
n = 30 
  
 Again, I find a surprising pattern: participants in the Endogenous 
Source/Coordinating condition report seemingly lower scores of vertical collective 
identity than those in the control group or any other treatment groups. The patterns 
depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 imply that, unexpectedly, the combination of 
endogenous control and a coordinating frame hurts the social identity shared between 






                                                
8 I find similar patterns and results (untabulated) in all statistical tests that I perform using the alternative 
measure of vertical collective identity. 
 38 
Figure 5: Means Plot of Vertical Collective Identity (All Conditions) 
 
 
5.1.2. Descriptive Statistics of Covariates 
Social Orientation 
 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the first covariate, Social Orientation, 
across conditions. The Social Orientation scale measures participants’ social value 
orientation based on their responses to nine hypothetical situations. A lower score on this 
scale indicates higher prosocial orientation (1 = prosocial; 2 = individualistic; 3 = 
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Control Source
Framing = No Frame Framing = Monitoring Frame
Framing = Coordinating Frame
Predictive Margins
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Social Orientation (All Conditions) 
 
Control Framing 









n = 30 
1.33 
(0.55) 
n = 30 
1.27 
(0.64) 




n = 30 
1.30 
(0.53) 
n = 30 
1.20 
(1.46) 




n = 30 
1.26 
(0.51) 
n = 31 
1.33 
(0.55) 
n = 30 
  
 The statistical test reported on Table 4 indicates that covariate means do not differ 
across nine conditions. Since Social Orientation does not vary systematically across 
conditions, I conclude that the random assignment is successful and prevents Social 
Orientation from correlating with other variables across conditions, including the 
treatment variables themselves. 
 
Table 4: One-Way ANOVA Test: Social Orientation Means Across Conditions  
 df MS F p-value 
Model 8 0.2278 0.64 0.75 
Conditions 8 0.2278 0.64 0.75 
Error 262 0.3573   
R-square: 1.91%     
 
Intrinsic Motivation 
 Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the second covariate, Intrinsic 
Motivation, across conditions. The Social Orientation scale measures participants’ levels 
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of intrinsic motivation when completing their AMT tasks, which are rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (very unmotivated) to 7 (very motivated). 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Intrinsic Motivation (All Conditions) 
 
Control Framing 









n = 30 
4.78 
(1.17) 
n = 30 
4.23 
(1.44) 




n = 30 
4.59 
(1.41) 
n = 30 
4.01 
(1.08) 




n = 30 
4.15 
(1.35) 
n = 31 
4.49 
(1.10) 
n = 30 
  
 The statistical test reported on Table 6 indicates that covariate means do not differ 
across nine conditions. Since Intrinsic Motivation does not vary systematically across 
conditions, I conclude that the random assignment is successful and prevents Intrinsic 
Motivation from correlating with other variables across conditions, including the 
treatment variables themselves. 
 
Table 6: One-Way ANOVA Test: Intrinsic Motivation Means Across Conditions  
 df MS F p-value 
Model 8 2.7704 1.64 0.11 
Conditions 8 2.7704 1.64 0.11 
Error 262 1.6910   




5.2. Tests of Main Hypotheses: H1 and H2 
5.2.1. Tests of H1A and H2A 
Manipulation Checks 
 I conduct a set of two ANOVA tests to check whether the manipulations are 
successful. The first ANOVA test is conducted with two levels of control source as the 
independent variable and the participants’ responses on the perceived control source as 
the dependent variable. Participants rate their perceptions of the source of control in a 
binary scale, ranging from 1 (endogenous source) to 2 (exogenous source). Participants 
are more likely to perceive the control source as an endogenous source in the endogenous 
control conditions (M = 1.05, SD = 0.29) than in the exogenous conditions (M = 1.90, SD 
= 0.30), F(1, 119) = 254.46, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.90).  Specifically, 93% of 
participants passed the manipulation check. Hence, I conclude that the manipulation of 
control source is successful. 
 The second ANOVA tests is conducted with two levels of control framing as the 
independent variable and the participants’ responses on the perceived control frame as the 
dependent variable. Participants rate their perceptions of the purpose of control in a 
binary scale, ranging from 1 (monitoring purposes) to 2 (coordinating purposes). 
Participants are more likely to rate the control frame as a coordinating frame in the 
coordinating frame conditions (M = 1.93, SD = 0.25) than in the monitoring frame 
conditions (M = 1.54, SD = 0.50), F(1, 119) = 29.35, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.98). 
Specifically, 49% of participants failed the manipulation check. Therefore, I conclude 




Table 7: ANCOVA Model of Employee Effort 
 df MS F p-value 
Model 4 1599.04 2.86 0.03 
Control Source 1 79.10 0.14 0.71 
Control Framing 1 76.49 0.14 0.71 
Control Source x Control Framing 1 289.48 0.52 0.47 
Intrinsic Motivation 1 5327.14 9.54 0.00 
Error 116 558.54   
R-square: 8.99%     
  
 Table 7 presents the ANCOVA test of employee effort on control source and 
control framing. Controlling for the participants’ scores of intrinsic motivation, I do not 
find statistical significance on the interaction of control source and control framing. 
When I exclude the covariate (Intrinsic Motivation), I still fail to find statistical 
significance. The results are reported in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: ANOVA Model of Employee Effort 
(Excluding Intrinsic Motivation as Covariate) 
 df MS F p-value 
Model 3 356.34 0.59 0.62 
Control Source 1 88.68 0.15 0.70 
Control Framing 1 27.54 0.05 0.83 
Control Source x Control Framing 1 955.56 1.59 0.21 
Error 117 599.30   





 Table 9 below shows the analyses of simple effects, which are also not 
statistically significant. In sum, I fail to find support for H1A and H2A.  
 
Table 9: Simple Effect Tests – Employee Effort 
Comparisons: Contrast Std. Err. df F p-value 
Endogenous Source/Monitoring Frame vs. 
Exogenous Source/Monitoring Frame 
-1.53 6.10 1 0.06 0.80 
Endogenous Source/Coordinating Frame vs. 
Exogenous Source/Coordinating Frame 
4.76 6.19 1 0.60 0.44 
 
Figure 6: Predictive Margins Plot – Employee Effort 
 
 
 Figure 6 above displays the plot of the means transferred points (Employee Effort) 
for each combination of control source and control framing. While the results do not 

















Monitoring Frame Coordinating Frame
Predictive Margins
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the direction of results is unexpected. In the coordinating frame, participants seem to 
exert lower effort when the control is endogenous than when it is exogenous, which 
counters with H2A. In the monitoring frame, the effort means of the exogenous control 
seems to be lower, or close to, the means of the endogenous control. Again, this 
directional pattern contradicts H1A. The plot also suggests that the endogenous control 
with a coordinating frame does not promote effort as I have predicted; in fact, 
participants in this condition appear to exert lower effort than, or the same level of effort 
as, the endogenous control with a monitoring frame. 
 
5.2.2. Tests of H1B and H2B 
 Table 10 below presents the ANCOVA test of vertical collective identity on 
control source and control framing. Controlling for the participants’ scores of social 
orientation, I also do not find statistical significance on the interaction of control source 
and control framing. Likewise, the interaction effect is not statistically significant when I 
exclude Social Orientation as a covariate (results are tabulated in Table 11). 
 
 Table 10: ANCOVA Model of Vertical Collective Identity 
 df MS F p-value 
Model 4 5.39 2.55 0.04 
Control Source 1 13.47 6.38 0.01 
Control Framing 1 0.19 0.09 0.76 
Control Source x Control Framing 1 1.97 0.93 0.34 
Social Orientation 1 7.26 3.44 0.07 
Error 116 244.79   
R-square: 8.09%     
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Table 11: ANOVA Model of Vertical Collective Identity 
(Excluding Social Orientation as Covariate) 
 df MS F p-value 
Model 3 4.76 2.21 0.09 
Control Source 1 12.71 5.90 0.02 
Control Framing 1 0.22 0.10 0.75 
Control Source x Control Framing 1 1.44 0.67 0.42 
Error 117 2.15   
R-square: 5.36%     
 
 Table 12 below shows the analyses of simple effects. The difference between two 
cells in the monitoring frame, on the one hand, is not significant, implying that I fail to 
find support for H2A. 
 
Table 12: Simple Effect Tests – Vertical Collective Identity 
Comparisons:  Contrast Std. 
Err. 
df F p-value 
Endogenous Source/Monitoring 
Frame vs. Exogenous 
Source/Monitoring Frame 
0.41 0.37 1 1.23 0.27 
Endogenous Source/Coordinating 
Frame vs. Exogenous 
Source/Coordinating Frame 








Figure 7: Predictive Margins Plot – Vertical Collective Identity 
 
 
 On the other hand, I find a statistical difference between the Endogenous 
Source/Coordinating and the Exogenous Source/Coordinating conditions (p-value = 
0.02). However, the significant result that I find from the simple effect test above does 
not necessarily support H2B. In fact, Figure 7 displays that the significant effect yields a 
direction that is contrary to H2B: the means score of vertical collective identity in the 
Exogenous Source/Coordinating Frame appears to be higher than in the Endogenous 
Source/Coordinating Frame. In the monitoring frame, the plot displays that the 
exogenous control appears to yield higher scores of vertical collective identity than the 
endogenous control, a direction that is consistent with H2A. As mentioned previously, 
the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.27). Collectively, I conclude that I fail 
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5.2.3. Mediation Analysis: Tests of H1C and H2C 
 I perform the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to build my mediation 
models. SUR models take into account the fact that there are multiple equations and that 
the residuals for those equations may be correlated with each other (Zellner & Huang, 
1962). 9  The SUR framework is suitable for mediation analysis with categorical 
independent variables (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group). 
 






  Vertical Collective Identity (MV) 1.42 8% 10.65 0.03 





     
 
Vertical Collective Identity (Mediating Variable) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. z p-value 95% CI 
 Control Source 0.41 0.36 1.13 0.26 -0.30 1.13 
Control Framing -0.18 0.37 -0.48 0.63 -0.90 0.55 
Control Source x Control Framing 0.51 0.52 0.99 0.32 -0.51 1.53 
Social Orientation -0.43 0.23 -1.89 0.06 -0.87 0.01 
Constant 3.22 0.39 8.22 0.00 2.45 3.99 
 
Effort (Dependent Variable) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. z p-value 95% CI 
 Vertical Collective Identity 1.78 1.53 1.16 0.25 -1.22 4.78 
Control Source -2.76 5.99 -0.46 0.65 -14.50 8.99 
Control Framing -2.04 6.03 -0.34 0.74 -13.85 9.77 
Control Source x Control Framing 6.70 8.54 0.79 0.43 -10.03 23.44 
Intrinsic Motivation 4.61 1.80 2.56 0.01 1.08 8.14 
Social Orientation -2.53 3.71 -0.68 0.50 -9.80 4.75 
Constant 18.55 10.91 1.70 0.09 -2.84 39.93 
  
                                                
9 Seemingly unrelated regression is considered a “pure” structural model, a subset of the structural-equation 
modeling framework, that does not include latent variables. 
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 The results in Table 13 show that the root mean squared error (RMSE) values of 
both models are high. As lower values of RMSE indicate better fit, the mediation analysis 
reveals that both models are poorly specified. In addition, I fail to find support for the 
hypothesized mediation model (i.e., H1C and H2C). I also test the significance of indirect 
effect, i.e. whether the vertical collective identity mediates the relationship between 
employee effort and the interaction of control source and control framing. Table 14 below 
shows that the indirect effect is not significant. 
 
Table 14: Test of Indirect Effect 
 
Coeff
. Std. Err. z 
p-
value 95% CI 
 Indirect effect (using delta method) 0.91 1.21 0.75 0.45 -1.46 3.29 
  
 The distribution of indirect effects is often skewed and violates the assumption 
that it is normal distributed, making it harder to detect the effects. Therefore, it is 
recommended that bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals be used. I present 
the results of bootstrapping in Table 9 below. The indirect effect is still not significant 
after bootstrapping. Overall, I still cannot find empirical evidence to support H1C and 
H2C. 
Table 15: Test of Indirect Effect (Bootstrapping) 




95% CI Bootstrap results: 
(replications = 10,000) 
Indirect effect (percentile CI) 0.91 -0.21 1.49 -1.49 4.55 
Indirect effect (biased-corrected CI) -0.73 6.09 
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 As a robustness test, I run a path analysis as an alternative mediation test. The 
results of the path analysis are similar to the earlier results, suggesting that I still fail to 
support H1C and H2C. Results are tabulated in Table 16 below. 
Table 16: Path Analysis 
 
 
Vertical Collective Identity 
(Mediating Variable) 
Path (R-square = 7.35%) Coeff. Std. Err. t p-value 
Control Source -> VCI 0.62 0.36 1.13 0.26 
Control Framing -> VCI 0.00    
Control Source x Control Framing -> VCI 0.04 0.13 0.31 0.76 
Social Orientation -> VCI -0.41 0.23 -1.79 0.08 
Constant 2.20 0.94 2.34 0.02 
  Effort (Dependent Variable) 
Path (R-square = 10.05%) Coeff. Std. Err. t p-value 
Vertical Collective Identity -> Effort 1.82 1.58 1.15 0.25 
Control Source -> Effort -0.16 4.88 -0.03 0.97 
Control Framing -> Effort 0.00    
Control Source x Control Framing -> Effort 0.68 2.15 0.32 0.75 
Intrinsic Motivation -> Effort 4.86 1.82 2.67 0.01 
Social Orientation -> Effort -2.22 3.80 -0.58 0.56 
Constant 11.34 17.59 0.64 0.52 
 
 
5.3. Tests of Additional Hypothesis: H3 
 H3 predicts that participants in the absence of control frame conditions will be 





Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort  
Based on Perceived Control Purpose in the Absence of Control Framing 
 
 Perceived Control Frame Monitoring Coordinating 
No Source No Frame 
33.75 
(28.39) 
n = 4 
43.26 
(23.01) 
n = 26 
Endogenous 
Source No Frame 
5.00 
(0.00) 
n = 1 
28.62 
(25.70) 
n = 29 
Exogenous 
Source No Frame 
5.00 
(0.00) 
n = 2 
38.75 
(25.08) 
n = 28 
  
 Contrary to my expectations, the results above show that 92% of participants in 
the no-frame conditions perceive that the reason behind control implementation is for 
coordinating purposes. Consequently, I fail to find support for H3A. I also do not find a 
statistically significant result that supports H3B, although the pattern trend is consistent 
with the prediction, i.e. the average of employee effort appear to be lower in the 
Endogenous Source/No Frame condition (M = 27.83, SD = 27.83, n = 30) than in the 
Exogenous Source/No Frame condition (M = 36.50, SD = 25.67, n = 30). At the same 
time, I acknowledge that even the directional trend is consistent with H3B, the means 
difference is not likely triggered by the participants’ belief that the purpose of controls in 






Table 18: Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Collective Identity  
Based on Perceived Control Purpose in the Absence of Control Framing 
 
 Perceived Control Frame Monitoring Coordinating 
No Source No Frame 
2.00 
(0.82) 
n = 4 
3.07 
(1.76) 
n = 26 
Endogenous 
Source No Frame 
2.00 
(0.00) 
n = 1 
2.86 
(1.51) 
n = 29 
Exogenous 
Source No Frame 
2.50 
(2.12) 
n = 2 
2.93 
(1.70) 
n = 28 
 
 Table 18 above shows the VCI means by conditions. I find no statistical 
difference in the strength of vertical collective identity across perceived control cells 
(untabulated omnibus ANOVA results: F(3, 70) = 0.83, p-value = 0.48). Accordingly, I 
cannot find support for H3C. However, I find that partitioning the results based on 
participants’ perceived control frame gives me a pattern consistent with my intuition: the 
strength of vertical collective identity is lower when participants are more likely to 
perceive that the reason behind control implementation is for monitoring purposes than 
for coordinating purposes. 
 
5.4. Supplementary Analyses 
5.4.1. Statistical Tests Based on Participants’ Perceived Control Source and 
Perceived Control Framing 
 Given the findings I obtained when testing H3, I speculate that the overwhelming 
number of people perceiving the reason behind control implementation as coordinating 
purposes may influence the participants’ responses. Additionally, the manipulation of 
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control framing appears to be unsuccessful: a further investigation (untabulated) reveals 
that 55% of participants in the monitoring conditions perceive that the reason behind 
control implementation is for coordinating purposes. 
 Therefore, I decide to partition the data based on the perceived control frame and 
the perceived control source. I acknowledge that analyzing data using the participants’ 
perceptions, rather than the treatment manipulations, takes away my ability to make 
causal inferences.  
 
Table 19: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort on Perceived Conditions 
 







n = 8 
43.91 
(22.53) 




n = 26 
37.52 
(24.41) 




n = 20 
38.17 
(24.73) 
n = 82 
 
 
 Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics of Employee Effort based on the 
participants’ perceived control source and perceived control frame. In addition, Figure 8 





Figure 8: Predictive Margins Plot – Employee Effort 
 
 
 Table 20: ANCOVA Model of Employee Effort 
Based on Perceived Conditions 
 
 df MS F p-value 
Model 4 820.17 1.36 0.25 
Perceived Control Source 1 321.08 0.53 0.47 
Perceived Control Frame 1 597.59 0.99 0.32 
Perceived Source x Perceived Frame 1 65.26 0.11 0.74 
Intrinsic Motivation 1 2223.27 3.69 0.06 
Error 226 603.21   
R-square: 2.35%     
 
 Based on the ANCOVA shown in Table 20 above, I still fail to find support for 












No Source Endogenous Exogenous
Perceived Control Source
Perceived Purpose = Monitoring Perceived Purpose = Coordinating
Predictive Margins
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However, when I plot the effort means using participants’ perceived control source and 
perceived control framing, some interesting patterns emerge. 
 
Figure 9: Predictive Margins Plot – Employee Effort (Perceived Main Treatments) 
 
 
 Figure 9 suggests that, when participants believe that the controls are for 
monitoring purposes and imposed endogenously, they appear to exert lower effort than 
those who perceive the same control frame but believe that the control is exogenous. This 
direction is consistent with H1A. At the same time, when participants believe that the 
controls are for coordinating purposes, the effort of participants do not seem to vary with 
their perceptions of control source.  
 Table 21 shows the descriptive statistics of Vertical Collective Identity based on 















Perceived Purpose = Monitoring Perceived Purpose = Coordinating
Predictive Margins
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Figure 10 displays means plots of Vertical Collective Identity for all perceived 
conditions. 
 
Table 21: Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Collective Identity 
on Perceived Conditions 
 







n = 8 
3.19 
(1.80) 




n = 26 
3.09 
(1.53) 




n = 20 
2.84 
(1.50) 
n = 82 
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Table 22: ANCOVA Model of Vertical Collective Identity 
Based on Perceived Conditions 
 
 df MS F p-value 
Model 4 3.09 1.34 0.26 
Perceived Control Source 1 0.00 0.00 0.96 
Perceived Control Frame 1 1.47 0.63 0.43 
Perceived Source x Perceived Frame 1 2.35 1.02 0.31 
Social Orientation 1 7.71 3.33 0.07 
Error 226 2.31   
R-square: 2.31%     
 
 The ANCOVA model above does not detect a statistical significant finding using 
participants’ belief on control source and control framing. On the other hand, Figure 11 
plots the means of vertical collective identity for the participants’ perceived control 


















 Figure 11 displays an interaction plot, which is consistent with H2A and H2B. 
When participants believe that the controls are for monitoring purposes, participants rate 
weaker vertical collective identity in the endogenous control than in the exogenous 
control. The line trend goes in an opposite direction when participants perceive that the 
controls are for coordinating purposes: the scores of participants’ vertical collective 
identity are higher in the endogenous control than in the exogenous control. In sum, the 
directional trend is consistent with my predictions. At the same time, I acknowledge the 
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  Vertical Collective Identity 
(MV) 1.50 2.31% 5.47 0.24 
  Points (DV) 23.49 8.66% 21.92 0.00 





     
 
Vertical Collective Identity 
(Mediating Variable) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. z p-value 95% CI 
 Perceived Control Source 0.27 0.45 0.59 0.55 -0.61 1.15 
Perceived Control Frame 0.46 0.33 1.38 0.17 -0.19 1.11 
Perceived Source x Perceived 
Frame -0.51 0.50 -1.02 0.31 -1.49 0.47 
Social Orientation -0.30 0.16 -1.85 0.07 -0.62 0.02 
Constant 3.04 0.35 8.68 0.00 2.35 3.73 
 
Effort (Dependent Variable) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. z p-value 95% CI 
Vertical Collective Identity 3.24 1.06 3.06 0.00 1.17 5.32 
Perceived Control Source 4.86 7.01 0.69 0.49 -8.88 18.60 
Perceived Control Frame 5.67 5.22 1.09 0.28 -4.56 15.90 
Perceived Source x Perceived 
Frame -2.79 7.86 -0.36 0.72 -18.19 12.61 
Intrinsic Motivation 1.40 1.20 1.17 0.24 -0.96 3.76 
Social Orientation -5.61 2.57 -2.18 0.03 -10.65 -0.57 
Constant 23.03 7.64 3.01 0.00 8.05 38.01 
 
 
Table 24: Test of Indirect Effect Based on Perceived Conditions 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. z 
p-
value 95% CI 





Table 25: Test of Indirect Effect Based on Perceived Conditions (Bootstrapping) 




95% CI Bootstrap results: 
(replications = 10,000) 
Indirect effect (percentile CI) 
-1.40 0.02 1.54 
-4.78 1.46 
Indirect effect (biased-
corrected CI) -5.23 1.12 
 
 Finally, the mediation analysis above based on the perceived conditions. I do not 
find statistically significant findings that can support the expected mediation relationship. 
 
5.4.2. Statistical Tests after Excluding Participants Who Failed Manipulation 
Checks 
 Given the fact that a high number of participants failed the manipulation of 
control framing, I run similar statistical tests after excluding those who failed in both 
manipulations. Based on responses of participants who passed both manipulations, Table 
26 and Table 27 report the descriptive statistics of Effort and Vertical Collective Identity, 
respectively. 
 
Table 26: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort 
Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks 
 






n = 13 
38.46 
(26.26) 




n = 15 
47.80 
(21.89) 




Table 27: Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Collective Identity 
Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks 
 






n = 13 
2.57 
(1.47) 




n = 15 
3.24 
(1.54) 
n = 25 
 
 Similar to previous results, I failed to find support for H1A, H1B, H2A, and H2B. 
Results are tabulated below. 
 
Table 28: ANCOVA Model of Employee Effort 
Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks 
 
 df MS F p-value 
Model 4 1383.79 2.48 0.05 
Control Source 1 1404.24 2.52 0.12 
Control Framing 1 1739.59 3.12 0.08 
Control Source x Control Framing 1 28.75 0.05 0.82 
Intrinsic Motivation 1 1921.93 3.44 0.07 
Error 74 558.04   







Table 29: ANCOVA Model of Vertical Collective Identity 
Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks 
 
 df MS F p-value 
Model 4 2.11 0.89 0.48 
Control Source 1 3.15 1.32 0.25 
Control Framing 1 0.13 0.06 0.81 
Control Source x Control Framing 1 1.45 0.61 0.44 
Social Orientation 1 2.52 1.06 0.31 
Error 74 2.38   
R-square: 4.57%     
  
 Finally, my mediation analysis does not result in statistical significance despite 
using responses that passed manipulation checks. Therefore, I cannot find evidence to 





















  Vertical Collective Identity (MV) 1.49 4.57% 3.78 0.44 





     
 
Vertical Collective Identity (Mediating Variable) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. z p-value 95% CI 
 Control Source 0.1338 0.5661 0.24 0.81 -0.98 1.24 
Control Framing -0.3705 0.5079 -0.73 0.47 -1.37 0.62 
Control Source x Control Framing 0.5692 0.7054 0.81 0.42 -0.81 1.95 
Social Orientation -0.3166 0.2979 -1.06 0.29 -0.90 0.27 
Constant 3.3127 0.5532 5.99 0.00 2.23 4.40 
 
Effort (Dependent Variable) 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. z p-value 95% CI 
 Vertical Collective Identity 2.9160 1.7981 1.62 0.11 -0.61 6.44 
Control Source 9.6742 8.5292 1.13 0.26 -7.04 26.39 
Control Framing 12.0532 7.6737 1.57 0.12 -2.99 27.09 
Control Source x Control Framing -3.5508 10.7018 -0.33 0.74 -24.53 17.42 
Intrinsic Motivation 2.8474 2.2606 1.26 0.21 -1.59 7.27 
Social Orientation 0.4586 4.5963 0.10 0.92 -8.56 9.46 




6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
6.1. Potential Explanations for Non-Significant Findings 
 Considering the findings together, I do not obtain statistically significant support 
for the interaction effects of control source and control framing on employee effort. 
Additionally, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of the claim that vertical collective 
identity mediates the interaction effect. While I have pointed out that some of the results 
display expected directions, but these directions should be interpreted with caution. 
 I offer potential explanations concerning the non-significant results. First, this 
study may suffer from a strong social desirability bias. Recent studies have started to 
urge researchers in online environments to take into account of potential social 
desirability bias, which can amplify potential demand effects (Antin & Shaw, 2012). 
Prior work also shows that Amazon Mechanical Turk workers tend to score higher in 
social desirability (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011). I suspect that workers with 
high reputation may suffer higher social desirability bias due to their fear for getting their 
work rejected. A strong social desirability bias might explain why 55% of participants in 
the monitoring conditions believe that the controls are framed for coordinating purposes. 
I also find that the manipulation of control framing results in a much weaker effect size 
(Cohen’s d = 0.98) than the manipulation of control source (Cohen’s d = 2.90), which is 
probably the consequence of social desirability bias. In short, social desirability bias 
might lead the treatments of this study to be ineffective. 
 However, social desirability bias does not explain why the participants in the 
Endogenous Source /Monitoring Frame condition, who believe that the controls are for 
coordinating purposes, exert higher effort (M = 51.47, SD = 4.59, n = 17) than the 
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participants in the Endogenous Source/Coordinating Frame condition (M = 37.78, SD = 
5.00, n = 27) who also believe that the controls are for coordinating purposes. The 
difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.034). While I do not make a formal 
hypothesis concerning to this difference, it is surprising that the outcome of the 
Endogenous Source/Coordinating Frame condition is not as favorable as I have thought. 
 I speculate that another theory is at work. The prior literature points out that 
persuasive messages can backfire if the messages unintentionally make the recipient 
aware of the sender’s potentially self-serving motives (Ert et al., 2014). In this study, if 
participants buy into the invitation to collaborate, participants are expected to contribute 
more points, which will benefit their manager financially. Contrary to the expectation, I 
find that many participants responded to this message cynically, stating it as the 
manager’s attempt to profit from the participants’ hard work. Interestingly, in the 
monitoring conditions, many participants believe that “tough” messages are often 
necessary to prevent others from shirking effort; hence, these participants perceive that 
the controls are in place for coordinating purposes.  Consequently, they are also more 
willing to contribute more. A potential theoretical explanation for this finding is that 
negatively framed messages can be more persuasive and credible (Maheswaran & 
Meyers-Levy, 1990) especially when the circumstances call for a “healthy” suspicion 
(Hardin, 2004; Lumineau, 2014). 
 Overall, while this study does not find significant results, the study indicates that 
our understanding of control framing and control source is still wanting. Prior work 
emphasizes the needs for conveying messages that promote collaboration; yet, those 
studies do not discuss the potential backfire effects that can come from such messages. I 
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agree with Liu et al. (2015), who argue that future research is needed to explore the 
effects of different control frames. Finally, this study also suggests the detrimental effects 
of the failure to consider the strength of social desirable bias in online responses. 
Considering that online labor market has become an attractive alternative to student or 
scarce professional respondents, we need to further our understanding of how social 
desirability bias influences existing results and how we can address this challenge in 
future research.  
 
6.2. Opportunities for Future Research 
 Limitations of my study provide opportunities for future research. First, given the 
speculation that the monitoring frame appears to be more effective than the coordinating 
frame in some circumstances, future research may explore attributes of control framing 
that can enhance or undermine the effectiveness of controls. For instance, when do 
people view monitoring-framed controls as controls that are made for monitoring 
purposes rather than those that are made for coordinating purposes? Likewise, when do 
persuasive messages not backfire? Specifically, when do people not cynically respond to 
endogenous controls that claim to enhance collaboration? When investigating these 
questions, future research may examine the role of linguistic cues in shaping the 
credibility and the persuasiveness of messages (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) that are 
intended to frame the purposes of controls. 
 Second, due to the design choice, my study does not investigate the managers’ 
perceived strength of vertical collective identity. This study assumes that the managers 
also see themselves as sharing the same degree of social identity with their employees. 
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Contrary to this assumption, identity misfit is possible to occur in the leader-subordinate 
relationships (D. van Knippenberg, 2011), but prior work has not investigated the 
presence of this phenomenon in accounting settings. In addition, future research may also 
investigate whether and how controls can be a tool to re-align identity misfit, if any. 
 Third, this study only examines the effect of formal controls on developing the 
social identity shared between managers and employees. It is possible that informal 
controls may be as important as, or more important than, formal controls to enhance 
vertical collective identity. Furthermore, it is also interesting to examine the interaction 
effects of formal and informal controls on vertical collective identity, especially in the 
situation when these forms of controls send divergent social cues.  
 Fourth, future research may examine the effects of nested social identities. 
Employees might categorize themselves either at a subgroup level (e.g. at a business-unit 
level) or at a collective level (e.g. at a firm level).  The subgroup interests sometimes 
conflict with the collective interests (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Lee et al., 
2012; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Future studies can explore how the conflicting interests in 
nested social identities determine the effectiveness of controls, or how controls can be 
designed to remedy the problem. 
 Finally, future research may investigate the impact of social identity relative to 
the impact of social norms on employee effort. Recent studies suggest that management 
control design can activate social norms (Cardinaels & Yin, 2015; Douthit, Schwartz, 
Stevens, & Young, 2017; Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013), thereby affecting employee effort. 
It is not clear though, whether the effects of social norms would disappear once the 
presence of social identity was taken into account. While prior work agrees that 
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communication at the group level enhances group-oriented behavior, scholars have been 
debating why communication improves cooperation. There are two opposing theoretical 
camps within this debate: the proponents of the social identity explanation versus the 
proponents of the norm-based explanation. Prior literature suggests disparate results: 
some studies document the behavioral effects of social identity irrespective of social 
norms (see, e.g. Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988), other studies observe the working 
of norms (see, e.g. Bicchieri, 2002). Since both social identity and social norms are 
context-specific, it will be insightful to learn the attributes of controls that can induce 
social norms, social identity, or both. 
 
6.3. Epilogue 
 My first takeaway from this study is that the participant selection is crucial to a 
successful experiment. I assumed that AMT workers with high reputation would 
represent quality participants, but my assumption was wrong. It appears that workers with 
high reputation likely respond to questions in a manner that will presumably be viewed 
favorably by experimenters. The reason is that the workers are afraid that unfavorable 
answers will lead the experimenter to reject their work, hurting their reputation. Second, 
since AMT workers have a lot supervisory and managerial experience, they are likely to 
be responsible for framing a control at their workplaces. Therefore, it is difficult to 
manipulate their perception of control framing because they can ‘see through’ the real 
purpose of control. Hence, these findings suggest that college or masters students might 
be more representative proxy for common, non-managerial employees. 
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 Second, while the prior literature indicates that a typical way to frame control is 
by communicating the purposes of control to employees, it seems that this approach is 
not powerful enough to manipulate control framing in an experimental setting. 
Experimental economics studies suggest alternative ways to induce framing effects that 
can impact different levels of participants’ social identity and cooperative effort (Parks, 
Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013). A succinct yet powerful way is by structuring the 
experimental games as give-some versus take-same dilemmas (De Dreu & McCusker, 
1997). Alternatively, experimenters can also design the games such that the nature of 
participants’ initial endowments is framed as private as opposed to community property 
(Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2009). In short, structuring the experimental games, rather 














APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
(Demographics of Participants) 
Q1. You are: __ Female   __Male 
Q2. How old are you? ____ 
Q3. Do you have work experience? __Yes  __No 
Q4. (If Yes to Q3) How long is your work experience? __ years 
Q5. (If Yes to Q3) Do you have supervisory or managerial experience? __Yes __No 
Q6. (If Yes to Q5) How long is your supervisory/managerial experience? __ years 
Q7. (Intrinsic Motivation Scale) Rate your experience as AMT workers in the scale from 
1 (“Disagree”) to 7 (“Agree): 
 
In general, I enjoy working in AMT. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I find that most AMT tasks are boring. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I only work in AMT for money. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I have fun in completing AMT tasks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Regardless the pay amount, I am 
always motivated to complete my 
AMT tasks. 















 (Main Instrument) 
In this study, assume that you are an employee of PQR, Inc. You are working in Division 
X under the supervision of Manager A. 
Like you, Manager A is a real, anonymous Amazon Mechanical Turk worker who has 
agreed to participate in this survey. Currently, Manager A is supervising around 30 
employees (i.e. fellow Turk workers). 
It is now early January 2017, and you receive a memo sent by Manager A to all 
employees of Division X: 
 
Internal Memo 
From: Manager A 
To: Employees of Division X 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for all your hard work in 2016. With 
your help, we achieved our sales targets successfully last year. In 2017, we will be facing 
new opportunities and challenges, and our job is to continue providing our customers 
with the best products and services on the market. 
I look forward to working together with you all in 2017.  
Thank you, 
Manager A 













At PQR Inc., the performance of a division increases as employees put in more effort 
(i.e., work harder). In this setting, employees can demonstrate the level of their effort by 
contributing “points” to their division. 
Each employee, including you, has an initial endowment of 65 points. Hence, the 
maximum effort you can contribute to your division is 65 points.  
If a division receives more points from its employees, the performance of this division 
will thrive. When the performance of a division increases, its employees will be more 
likely to earn bonus compensation. 
As you can see from the table below, the more points you contribute, the higher the 
likelihood to earn your bonus pay of $0.80. At the same time, if Division X performs 
well, Manager A will likely earn some bonus pay too. The bonus pay will be paid to 
Manager A’s Amazon Mechanical Turk account. 
Note that your initial endowment is worth $0.01/point, so the total value of your initial 
endowment is $0.65. The remaining points of your endowment after your contribution 
will be converted to be real dollars and paid to your Amazon Mechanical Turk account 
after you have submitted this HIT. Your contributions increase by increments of 5 points.  
Example: 
If you decide to contribute 50 points, your contribution cost is $0.50. Hence, the 
remaining initial endowment to be paid at the end of HIT is $0.15. In addition, based on 
the table below, a 50-point contribution will allow you to a 75% chance to earn $0.80 
bonus pay. A lottery will be drawn based on this probability. If you win, the $1 bonus pay 




Your Contribution Cost Probability of Earning $0.80 Bonus Pay 
5 $0.05 30% 
10 $0.10 35% 
15 $0.15 40% 
20 $0.20 45% 
25 $0.25 50% 
30 $0.30 55% 
35 $0.35 60% 
40 $0.40 65% 
45 $0.45 70% 
50 $0.50 75% 
55 $0.55 80% 
60 $0.60 85% 
65 $0.65 90% 
 
Please proceed to the next page. 
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(Comprehension Checks) 
Q1. Based on the table above, if you decide to contribute 15 points to your division, how 




Q2. If you decide to contribute 15 points to your division, how much is the remaining 














(Endogenous/Monitoring Condition) Manager A was given a choice and has decided to 
implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 points. 
Manager A explains the purpose of this policy in the following memo: 
 
Internal Memo 
From: Manager A 
To: Employees of Division X 
I will implement a policy that will require you to contribute at least 5 points to ensure that 
your contribution can cover core expenses of Division X throughout the year.  I want 
you to know that I made this decision, and it is within my authority. 
I will use my policy to restrict your ability to keep all of your points for yourself. I 
believe that if you transfer fewer than what I have required, you will hurt the business of 
Division X.  
Essentially, I decided to implement my policy to prevent you from spending too little 




Please proceed to the next page. 
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(Exogenous/Monitoring Condition) The executive management of PQR, Inc. has 
decided to implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 
points. This decision is beyond Manager A’s authority. 
Manager A explains the purpose of this policy in the following memo: 
 
Internal Memo 
From: Manager A 
To: Employees of Division X 
Executive management will implement a policy that will require you to contribute at least 
5 points because they want to ensure that your contribution can cover core expenses of 
Division X throughout the year.  Executive management wants you to know that the 
decision came from them, and it is beyond my authority. 
Executive management will use their policy to restrict your opportunities to keep all 
of your points for yourself. They believe that if you transfer fewer than what they have 
required, you will hurt the business of Division X. 
Essentially, executive management decided to implement their policy to prevent you 




Please proceed to the next page. 
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(Endogenous/Coordinating Condition) Manager A was given a choice and has decided 
to implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 points.  
Manager A explains the purpose of this policy in the following memo: 
 
Internal Memo 
From: Manager A 
To: Employees of Division X 
I will implement a policy that will require our employees to contribute at least 5 points to 
ensure that our contribution can cover core expenses of Division X throughout the year.  I 
want all of us to know that I made this decision, and it is within my authority. 
I will use my policy to facilitate the coordination of our effort in our division. If our 
employees transfer fewer than what I have required, we will hurt the business of our 
division. 
Essentially, I decided to implement my policy because it will promote our 




Please proceed to the next page. 
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(Exogenous/Coordinating Condition) The executive management of PQR, Inc. has 
decided to implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 
points. This decision is beyond Manager A’s authority. 
Manager A explains the purpose of this policy in the following memo: 
 
Internal Memo 
From: Manager A 
To: Employees of Division X 
Executive management will implement a policy that will require our employees to 
contribute at least 5 points because they want to ensure that our contribution can cover 
core expenses of Division X throughout the year.  Executive management wants all of 
us to know that the decision came from them, and it is beyond my authority. 
Executive management will use their policy to facilitate our effort coordination in 
our division. If our employees transfer fewer than what they have required, we would 
hurt the business of our division. 
Essentially, executive management decided to implement their policy because it will 








(Endogenous Only Condition) Manager A was given a choice and has decided to 
implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 points. 
Manager A announces this policy in the following memo: 
 
Internal Memo 
From: Manager A 
To: Employees of Division X 
My policy will require employees to contribute at least 5 points. My policy will ensure 
that the total contributions can cover core expenses of Division X throughout the year.  
Since I have the authority to implement a policy, I have decided that I will 








(Exogenous Only Condition) The executive management of PQR, Inc. has decided to 
implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 points. This 
decision is beyond Manager A’s authority. 
Manager A announces this policy in the following memo: 
 
Internal Memo 
From: Manager A 
To: Employees of Division X 
Executive management has decided that they will implement a policy in Division X. 
Their policy will require employees to contribute at least 5 points. Their policy will 
ensure that the total contributions can cover core expenses of Division X throughout the 
year. 









(Monitoring Only Condition) You learned about a new policy that requires each 
employee to contribute at least 5 points. You can find the announcement of this policy in 
the following memo: 
 
Internal Memo 
To: Employees of Division X 
 
This policy is designed to restrict your ability to keep the points for yourself. If you 
transfer fewer than what has been required, you will hurt the business of Division X. 








(Coordinating Only Condition) You learned about a new policy that requires each 
employee to contribute at least 5 points. You can find the announcement of this policy in 
the following memo: 
 
Internal Memo 
To: Employees of Division X 
 
This policy is designed to facilitate the coordination of our effort in Division X. If 
employees transfer fewer than what has been required, we will hurt the business of our 
division. 
Essentially, this policy will promote our cooperation, which is in our best interests. 
 
 




(Control Only Condition) You learned about a new policy that requires each employee 
to contribute at least 5 points.  
 





First, recall that the more points you contribute, the higher the likelihood to earn your 
bonus pay of $0.80. However, your contribution will cost you $0.01/point. Your initial 
endowment is 65 points, which are worth $0.65. If Division X receives more points from 
its employees, the performance of this division will thrive. At the same time, if Division 
X performs well, Manager A will likely earn some bonus pay too. 
 
Second, below is the message you have read previously: (based on the treatment 
condition) 
 
Q1a. (Employee Effort Scale) Indicate the number of points you would transfer to 
Division X.  
The number of points you’d like to transfer: ___________ points. 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 
 








Q2a. (Perceived Control Source) Who decided to implement the policy? 
A) Manager X. 
B) Executive management. 
C) The text did not tell me who decided to implement the policy. 
 
Q2b. (Perceived Control Frame) What do you think is most likely purpose of 
implementing the policy: 
A) The policy is designed to monitor and restrict employees’ behavior. 
B) The policy is designed to facilitate the coordination of employees’ effort. 
 
Please proceed to the next page.  
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Q3. (Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements, 
using the scale from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”): 
Manager A shared a common interest 
with me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Manager A made the decision in my 
best interest. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Manager A made me feel a sense of 
belonging in Division X. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Manager A made me believe that I 
matter to Division X. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Manager A stimulated my motivation 
to exert effort for Division X. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Manager A increased my optimism 
about the future of Division X. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Manager A motivated me to focus more 
on Division X’s best interests. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I am willing to support Manager A. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel that Manager A trusted me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel that Manager A believed in my 
integrity at work. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel that Manager A believed in my 
competence to put in effort for Division 
X. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel that Manager A gave me the 
autonomy to make decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Manager A is trustworthy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would be comfortable giving Manager 
A a task or problem that was critical to 
me, even if I could not monitor 
Manager A’s action. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
If someone questioned Manager A’s 
motives, I would give Manager A the 
benefit of the doubt. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would be willing to let Manager A 
have complete control over my future 
in this company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I really wish I had a way to keep an eye 
on Manager A. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
If I had my way, I wouldn’t let 
Manager A have any influence over 
issues that are important to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Q4. (Vertical Collective Identity Scale) Select the letter below (ranging from A to G) that 
best illustrates your perception about how the relationship between you and your manager 
encourages the shared sense of ‘us’: 
 





(Instructional Manipulation Check) 
When a big news story breaks, people often go online to get up-to-the-minute details on 
what is going on. We want to know from which websites people trust to get this 
information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to this question. To 
show that you have read this far, please ignore the question and select The Drudge Report 
and National Public Radio (NPR) as your two answers. 
When there is a big news story, which is the one news website you would visit first? 
(Please only choose one): 
New York Times website The Drudge Report The Associated Press (AP) 
website 
Huffington Post Google News Reuters website 
Washington Post website ABC News website National Public Radio 
(NPR) website 
CNN.com CBS News website USA Today website 
FoxNews.com NBC News website New York Post website 
MSNBC.com Yahoo! News None of these websites 
 

















Rate the extent to which you believe that Manager A is a real, anonymous Amazon 
Mechanical Turk worker using the scale from 1 (“Strongly Unbelievable”) to 7 
(“Strongly Believable”): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 




(Social Orientation Scale) Note that this task is independent from the previous tasks you 
have completed. 
In this task, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another 
person, who we will refer simply as the “Other.” This other person is someone you do not 
know and who you will not know in the future. Both you and the “Other” will be making 
choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce dollars for 
both yourself and the “Other”. Likewise, the other’s choice will produce dollars for 
him/her and for you. The more dollars you receive, the better for you, and the more 
dollars the “Other” receives, the better for him/her. 
 
Here’s an example of how this task works:  
 A B C 
You get $500 $500 $550 
“Other” gets $100 $500 $300 
 
In this example, if you chose A, you would receive $500 and “Other” would receive 
$100; if you chose B, you would receive $500 and “Other” $500; and if you chose C, you 
would receive $550 and “Other” $300. So, you see that your choice influences both the 
number of points you receive and the number of points the “Other” receives. 
Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong 
answers – choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember 
that the more dollars you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the “Other’s” 
point of view, the more dollars s/he accumulates, the better for him/her. 
For each of the nine choice situations, choose A, B, or C depending on which column you 
prefer most: 
 
(1) A B C 
You get $480 $540 $480 
“Other” gets $80 $280 $480 
 
(2) A B C 
You get $560 $500 $500 
“Other” gets $300 $500 $100 
 
(3) A B C 
You get $520 $520 $580 




(4) A B C 
You get $500 $560 $490 
“Other” gets $100 $300 $490 
 
(5) A B C 
You get $560 $500 $490 
“Other” gets $300 $500 $90 
 
(6) A B C 
You get $500 $500 $570 
“Other” gets $500 $100 $300 
 
(7) A B C 
You get $510 $560 $510 
“Other” gets $510 $300 $110 
 
(8) A B C 
You get $550 $500 $500 
“Other” gets $300 $100 $500 
 
(9) A B C 
You get $480 $490 $540 
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